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be restricted to the limited goal it was designed to achieve-providing care
and treatment to the incompetent defendant until such time as fie is fit to
proceed to trial.107
PAUL A. BATTAGLIA
THE FCC's FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN OPERATION
I. THE PROBLEM
The Office of Complaints and Compliance of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission received a complaint on February 26, 1970, filed by
Donald Jelinek on behalf of the San Francisco Women for Peace, the G.I.
Association, and The Resistance against radio stations KSFO, KCBS, and
and others in the San Francisco Bay area. According to Mr. Jelinek, "[t]he
complaint arises from the refusal by the above-named licensees to broad-
cast public service announcements expressing a viewpoint opposed to the
viewpoint expressed in public service announcements sponsored by various
branches of the United States' armed forces."
i
The following is an example of the United States' armed forces spots
that have been repeatedly broadcast by the licensees and that inspired the
petioners to act:
We understand you're looking for a man's job. Well we may just
have one. Who are we? We've been in business since 1775. We're
located in dose to 200 places around the world. We'll pay while
we are training you. Give you 30 days off per year. Give you a
chance to continue your education. And we'll build you a man.
We'll build you a marine. And that man and that marine will be
you. Ask a marine2
The position taken by the petitioners is that "by their vary nature,
the military-sponsored recruitment announcements suggest that military
service is desirable-a contention whose controversy is certainly heightened
107. As Vann and Morganforth have concluded
If it is necessary to justify or change our theory of punishment or the
methods utilized in the process of imprisonment let us face up to these
needs as a society. We suggest that we axe not 'helping' these persons by
finding an alternative method for removing them from society and, in
effect, imprisoning them. We further suggest that in attempting to
develop and practice a concept of fairness, due process in the administra-
tion of justice, we have developed a practice which is a denial of the
very due process we are trying to emulate.
Vann &s Morganforth, The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the Competence
to Stand Trial, 43 U. DEr. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1965).




by the Vietnam War, but not exclusively dependent on it: there are ad-
vantages and disadvantages to joining the military during peacetime as
during a war such as the one in Vietnam."s To present an opposing view,
or, at least to lead listeners to information concerning that opposing view,
the peitioners had submitted spots to licensees illustrated by the following:
Attention all men of draft age. What are you planning to do
about the draft? It is not generally known, but the Selective
Service Law does provide many deferments to which you may be
entitled. If the Army is not your bag, and you feel you may be
eligible for a deferment, do something about it now. Phone 642-
1431 for free information. Draft counsellors and attorneys are
available throughout the Bay area. Again that number is 642-
1431.4
Letters to the licensees requesting time for the broadcast of these
spots alleged that recruitment announcements presented only the view
that military life was desirable. Further the letters alleged that the licensee
had not given equally effective coverage to the undesirability of military
life (the overwhelming likelihood of being sent to Vietnam, the danger
to physical and mental well-being, the possibility of being required to
compromise one's individual moral principles), nor to the position, held
by senators of both major parties and subject to vigorous debate among
religious leaders and the press, that much of the current United States
military involvement is contrary to the national interest. Thus, given the
controversy and public concern over the life of the soldier in today's
United States armed forces and the repeated broadcast of spots only favor-
ing military induction, the petitioners claimed a right under the fairness
doctrine to reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities.
In answering this claim, the various licensees offered the following
arguments: 1) If there is an issue, we have covered it in our general pro-
gramming as required under the fairness doctrine. 2) No issue has been
raised by the recruitment spots concerning the draft, induction, the Viet-
nam War, conscientious objection because those spots have dealt only with
voluntary enlistment. Thus, there is no question of balancing interests
in our programming under the fairness doctrine. 8) We specialize in clas-
sical music and do not get involved in controversial issues. 4) Most all
public service announcements can be said to involve "controversial issues."
How far do you expect to extend the fairness doctrine?
Subsequently, the complaint filed with the FCC charged that:
Inasmuch as KSFO and KCBS [and the others] consistently broad-




controversial issue of public importance and have consistently
refused to broadcast public service announcements with opposing
views on the same controversial issue, they have failed to fulfill
their legal obligation under the Fairness Doctrine.5
The focus of this comment will be the nature of a licensee's obliga-
tion to provide fair broadcasting of controversial issues under the fairness
doctrine. This question will require an inquiry into the general powers
and limitations of the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934, the
development of the so-called "fairness doctrine" in the broadcast industry,
and the relation of its most recent formulation to the first amendment and
the possibility of granting access rights to the airwaves.
II. THE CHARACTER ov THE FCC AND THE EvOLUTION oF ITS FAIRNEss POLICY
Under the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC was committed to
"regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire
and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities for the purpose of
national defense, [and] for the purpose of promoting safety of life and
property ... ."6 In employing its general licensing and rule-making power,
the FCC was to act in furtherance of the public convenience, interest, or
necessity.7 Specific application of this authority takes various forms: 1)
comparative hearings in determining which applicant is most likely to be
capable of serving the public interest and therefore most deserving of a
license; 2) the issuance of an enforcement letter to a station stating the
Commission's view on how to deal with'a particular complaint; 3) the issu-
ance of a "cease and desist" oider where a licensee has failed to operate
substantially as set forth in his license and the rules of the FCC; and 4)
revocation of a license for false statements, willful and repeated violation
of provisions of license, the Communications Act, an FCC rule, or a cease
and desist order.8 However, by section 326 of the Act,
[n]othing in this act shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over . . . any radio station,
and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by
the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech
by means of radio communication.9
5. Id.
6. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
7. Id. §§ 307(a),(d).
8. Id. § 312.
9. Id. § 326.
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An early trace of the fairness doctrine sentiment is found in Great
Lakes Broadcasting decided immediately following enactment of the Radio
Act of 1927, where the "public interest" in regulating the air frequencies
was viewed in terms of "requiring ample play for the free and fair com-
petition of opposing views ... in all discussions of issues of importance
to the public."0 In 1930, at the hearings before the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce prior to 'the enactment of the Communications Act of
1984, Senator Dill commented 'that, aside from the right of political can-
didates to acquire equal radio time for campaigning (a provision that
was codified in section 315 of the Act), the FCC had the potential power
to require a licensee to give at least "fair" time to representatives of views
opposed to those expressed on or by the station on a major public ques-
tion-representatives not necessarily chosen by the licensee as spokesman
for the opposing view. Ultimately, he hoped this requisite would cause
broadcasters to assume an affirmative duty to seek out and air contro-
versy." Subsequent efforts by legislators to impose such a definitive duty
(by establishing firm standards as to the percentage of program time de-
voted to discussion of public issues, and a clearer policy as to what con-
stituted programming in the public interest) have failed. 12 Instead, after
unsuccessfully experimenting in Mayflower Broadcasting Co.'s with a com-
plete ban on licensee editorializing 'to ensure that the air waves remained
public, the FCC attempted to create its own version of an affirmative duty
in its Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees of 1949.14
The 1949 Report is considered the key formulation of the fairness
doctrine. It recognizes the potential contribution of radio to the general
first amendment policy of developing "an informed public opinion through
public dissemination of news and ideas concerning the vital public issues
of the day."' 5 Consequently, the FCC established the "necessity for licen-
sees to devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to ... pro-
grams devoted to the consideration and discussion of public issues of
interest in the community .. ."16 The duty of the licensee is founded on
the principle that "it is the right of the public to be informed, rather
than any right on the part of the government, any broadcast licensee or
any individual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views
10. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929) [3rd Annual
Report of Federal Radio Commission].
11. Hearings on S. 6 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess., at 1616 (1930).
12. See Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An
Evaluation, 30 GEo. WASH. L. R.y. 1, 38-39 (1961).
13. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1944).
14. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
15. Id. at 1249.
16. Id.
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on any matter, which is the foundation stone of the American system of
broadcasting."' 7 The maintenance of radio as a medium of free speech
wil be dependent upon the licensee's fair, reasonable discretion in pro-
gramming. Although the FCC rejected an approach that would either
1) oblige the licensee to ensure fair presentation of al sides before any
time is allotted for an issue or 2) state that the licensee's sole obligation
is to refrain from suppressing or excluding any responsible point of view
from access, it wished to establish an "affirmative duty generally to encour-
age and implement the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues"
over and beyond the obligation to furnish reasonable opportunity for a
particular view when it is demanded.' 8 The definition of "controversial"
or "vital public matters," "reasonable opportunity" and the licensee's "fair
discretion" was left to the "good faith judgment" of the licensee. He was
charged with the responsibility of establishing a reasonable balance of
interests in his programming of a particular issue; he would not be penal-
ized, however, when his license came up for renewal for an isolated infrac-
tion of the fairness doctrine that was an honest mistake. The licensee's
performance under the fairness doctrine would be judged according to the
licensee's demonstrated concern and service to the public interest.
The 1959 amendment to section 315 of the Communications Act incor-
porated the fairness doctrine. Following a statement that the licensee was
exempt from providing "equal time" to political candidates when they
appeared in bona fide newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, or
on-the-spot coverage of news events, the amendment adds:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters [in their presentation of newscasts, news interviews,
etc.,] from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter
to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable oppor-
tunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance.'9
The general development of the fairness doctrine is represented in
FCC case history by holdings such as: "the broadcaster must give adequate
coverage to public issues;" 0 "coverage must be fair in that it accurately
reflects the opposing views;"'' 9 coverage must be accomplished "at the
broadcaster's own expense if sponsorship is unavailable; "22 a "licensee may
not delegate his responsibility to others, and particularly not 'to an advo-
17. Id.
18. Id at 1251.
19. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (4) (1964).
20. United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
21. New Broadcasting Co., 6 P &c F RADIO RG. 258 (1950).
22. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 516 (1965).
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cate of one particular viewpoint;" 23 and where a licensee has editorialized
as to a controversial issue and rejected, as inappropriate, a spokesman of
an opposing view "it is incumbent upon [him] . .. to renew and intensify
[his] efforts to obtain an appropriate spokesman., 24
Problems have arisen, however, in applying a standard of fairness
based on the judgment of a licensee. Occasionally the Commission has
sent warnings of its discontent with the balancing of interests in a licen-
see's programming; but it has never issued a cease and desist order for
violation of the fairness doctrine nor has it failed to renew a license on
the basis of a specific violation. The reason is that the FCC has not found
definite and consistent criteria upon which to judge fair programming
in the public interest that are clearly within the limits set by the censor-
ship clause of the Communications Act.
Lamar Life Insurance Co. provides an illustration of this inadequacy
in the fairness doctrine.25 In 1957, WLBT-TV presented a panel discus-
sion on "The Little Rock Crisis." The participants, all white and allegedly
representative of the segregationist point of view, spoke of "what the Negro
wants and doesn't want," and the NAACP requested time over WLBT-TV
facilities to present the Negro position on behalf of a group of Mississippi
Negroes. The request was denied. Responding to an FCC inquiry, the
station answered in part, that it did not regard the matter presented as
controversial because the participants merely urged the citizens to remain
calm. The Commission admitted that if that was all that was involved,
the existence of a question as to fair presentation was unlikely. On the
other hand, said the FCC, if partisan views were expressed, the station
would be obliged to present the opposing viewpoint. The FCC could
apply no meaningful criteria to the issue of whether or not partisan views
were expressed; it fell back upon the policy that "presentation of program
material lies solely with the licensee and the Commission cannot deter-
mine what particular program he may or may not broadcast; ... the licen-
see has the responsibility for seeing that his authorized facilities are not
used to misinform the public."
2 6
23. REPORT ON "LvING SHOULD BE FUN," 33 F.C.C. 101, 107 (1962). In this case
licensees had been broadcasting a, syndicated program in which a nutritionist offered
comment and advice on diet and health. Many of the programs raised controversial Issues.
Though the nutritionist had promised to be fair in the presentation of his views and
to solicit response from opposing spokesmen, the FCC held that the licensee was not
entitled under the fairness doctrine to rely on an assumed built-in fairness. If, for
example, the spokesmen of views opposed to the nutritionist refused to appear on the
air it was the licensee's responsibility to insure a balance through other means.
24. In re Richard Ruff, 19 F.C.C.2d 838, 839 (1969).
25. Lamar Life Insurance Co., 18 P & F RADIO REG. 683 (1959).
26. Id. at 684.
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A similar ruling by the FCC arose in Cullman Broadcasting Co.2T
The station had broadcast a program, "Life Line," critical of the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, and refused time to a group with an opposing view. The
FCC stated that where the licensee, in good faith, "has achieved a balanced
presentation of contrasting views, either by affording time to a particular
group of persons of its own choice or through its own programming, the
licensee's obligations under the fairness doctrine-to inform the public-
have been met."28 Consequently the groups request for an opportunity to
reply was denied.
The consistent use of vague, inarticulate language by the FCC in
applying the fairness doctrine has brought severe criticism. Professor
Barron suggests that
if the licensee does not editorialize and simply refuses or neglects
to program a particular disputed and important public issue, he
has in practical effect removed himself from the operation of the
rule.
As long as a significant amount of broadcast time has been de-
voted to public issue programming the licensee need not fear
reprisal by the Commission when he seeks license renewal. 9
Thus, according to Barron, rather than encourage the licensee to assume
an affirmative duty generally to broadcast controversial issues, the fairness
doctrine's only practical application has been to the performance of a licen-
see when confronted with a demand for time to reply to a view he has
already broadcast. Even then, the enforcement of a duty is limited by the
licensee's defense of acting within his reasonable discretion.
It has been said that under the present licensing scheme and applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine, the licensees are, in effect, permitted
to open or close access to their broadcast facilities according to
their own personal predilections.... [The] tendency is reinforced
by the circumstances that licensees profit in the first instance by
pleasing advertisers of mass marketed products. Thus they can be
expected to avoid ideas and personalities that might arouse the
aversion of a large number of potential viewers.... [T]he effect of
the present structure is to favor the broadcasting of views currently
popular with the majority or substantial minorities, especially
those views which support vested interests.8 0
Consequently, as Barron concludes, in a government effort to restrain
overpowering and oppressive individual or group expression in favor of
the broadcast of a multiplicity of views, the fairness doctrine, as it has
27. 40 F.C.C. 516 (1963).
28. Id. at 577.
29. Barron, supra note 12, at 20.
30. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HA.v. L. Rnv. 7, 140-41 (1969).
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been enunciated in the 1949 Report, the 1959 amendment, and various
cases, does not effectively impose an affirmative duty to cover controversy
and may indeed have contributed to a blandness and narrowness of scope
in serving the public interest.
The application of such a doctrine that is ill-defined in scope poses a
serious dilemma. On the one hand it may cause licensees to seek ways of
avoiding any legal obligation to cover controversial issues and, on the
other hand, may allow them discretion to yield to economic pressures in
programming. This raises questions as to the viability of 'the fairness doc-
trine and the first amendment policy of encouraging the broadest dis-
semination of views and ideas to develop a well informed society.
III. REcENT FORMULATIONS OF THE FAIRNEss DOGTRINE
The most recent statement of the fairness doctrine is found in the
Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.81 An
analysis of the Court's treatment of the problem of access to the licensee's
facilities in this case offers more refined criteria upon which to base an
affirmative legal obligation on the licensee.
The precise issue in Red Lion involved the validity of the FCC's 1967
rules dealing with the broadcast of personal attacks in the context of con-
troversial public issues and political editorials.
These rules require that: a licensee, before broadcasting a party's at-
tack on another person, provide the person to be attacked with certain
notice of the broadcast, a script, tape or summary of the broadcast, and an
offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities;
a licensee, within a certain time period after broadcasting an editorial en-
dorsing or opposing a candidate for office, send a script or tape of the edi-
torial to the other qualified candidate (s) or to the candidate whom he has
criticized and offer a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's
facilities.32
The rules are considered part of the fairness doctrine insofar as they
reflect the general duties laid down by the 1949 Report on Editorializing,
the 1959 amendment to the Communications Act and major FCC deci-
sions.33 The Court concludes that, by enacting the rules, the FCC has
zeroed in on a specialized aspect of the general fairness doctrine to find
that "adequate presentation of all sides may best be served by allowing
those most closely affected to make the response, rather than leaving the
31. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
32. 47 C.F.R. § 73.300 (1970).
33. E.g., Culiman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 516 (1968); New Broadcasting Co.,
6 P & F RADIo REG. 258 (1950); United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
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response in the hands of the station which has attacked their candidates,
endorsed their opponents, or carried a personal attack upon them."34
The Court held that the rules are within the general rule-making
powers of the FCC and in pursuance of the Commission's obligation to
consider the demands of the public interest in the course of granting
licenses. The 1959 amendment to section 315 was interpreted to have
"authorized the Commission to require licensees to use their stations for
discussion of public issues... [and] the FCC is free to implement this re-
quirement by reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of abridge-
ment of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship proscribed
by section 326 of the Act."3 5
The Court conceded that "the Communications Act is not notable for
the precision of its substantive standards ... "36 and then proposed that:
... in this respect, the explicit provisions of § 315, and the doc-
trine, and rules at issue here which are closely modeled upon that
section, are far more explicit than the generalized 'public interest'
standard in which the Commission ordinarily finds its sole guid-
ance.3
7
Thus it cannot be said that the rules on personal attack and political edi-
torials, reflecting a concern for the most relevant and effective presentation
of views, go beyond the FCC's power to insure service of the "public in-
terest" by licensees.
Regarding the issue of whether the FCC rules in question fostered an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of speech and press of broad-
casters, the Court stated that, because of the limited availability of fre-
quencies, the Government has a legitimate power to limit the number of
licensees and, more importantly, once a person has been awarded a license
"there is nothing in the first amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would other-
wise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves." 38 Extending this policy,
the Court added:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters which is paramount.... It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
34. 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969).
35. Id. at 382.
36. Id. at 385.
37. Id. at 385-86.
38. Id .at 389.
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itself or a private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) .... It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experience which is crucial here.89
Given these general principles the Court found the rules on personal
attack and political editorials consistent with the first amendment. Without
such rules the licensee would have the power to give access to only the
highest bidder or the spokesman with whom he agrees and thus communi-
cate only a narrow or personally selected range of views on issues, people,
or political candidates. "Freedom of the press from governmental inter-
ference under the first amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests." 40
Finally, the Court commented on the possibility (however remote)
that in the face of these specialized fairness doctrine rules, the licensee
might attempt to avoid any broadcast of personal attack or political edi-
torial and thereby defeat the general purpose of the fairness doctrine. In
the event of "self-censoring," the Court reaffirmed the validity of the FCC's
power to deny the renewal of a license on the grounds that the licensee
failed to present representative community views on controversial issues or,
in other words, that he failed to operate in the public interest.
While the holding in Red Lion was officially limited to affirming the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine and validating the FCC's personal
attack and political editorial rules, it seems that the Supreme Court's in-
terest in a general right of access for views which might not otherwise be
heard indicates an awareness of an existing evil in broadcasting-the broad-
caster's susceptibility to outside pressures resulting in one-sidedness or self-
censorship. Significantly, the Court recognized that on some occasions the
"reasonable" discretion allowed the licensee under the fairness doctrine
may not serve adequately to present all sides of a public question in the
most informative way-either because of his desire to avoid controversy and
accompanying obligations or his capitulation to economic pressures.
It is significant to note, at this point, that the Red Lion opinion sug-
gests two different approaches to the concept of fairness in broadcasting.
First, the Court, in supporting the rules in question, may have been
strictly concerned with bolstering the effectiveness of the fairness doctrine
in ensuring the widest possible dissemination of views and ideas. Secondly,
the Court may have been looking forward to a new first amendment right
of access of citizens to the airwaves, independent of the fairness doctrine
39. Id. at 390.
40. Id. at 392, quoting from Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945).
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and its reliance on good faith judgments of broadcasters. By the latter ap-
proach the paramount right of the viewers and listeners to have their
views represented in the general balance of interests would be replaced by
a more aggressive individual right to be heard.
Further discussion of the possible impact of Red Lion on the fairness
doctrine and the development of criteria upon which to base a licensee's
affirmative legal duty requires an analysis of Banzahf v. FCC.41
An issue raised in Banzahf was whether public service announcements
designed to discredit the image of the smoker implicit in smoking com-
mercials have a right of access to broadcast facilities under the fairness
doctrine. Is it a form of speech that is in the public interest and thus pro-
tected by the first amendment; will its introduction into the airwaves
constitute an abridgement of the cigarette industry's right to speak of its
product, and will the ordering of such broadcasts by the FCC constitute
censorship or a breach of the licensee's freedom of speech and press?
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Banzahf held
that, 1) "promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with
any of the interests [that] the first amendment seeks to protect ."42 and
that, 2) the anti-smoking spots fall into the realm of protected speech. It
is speech affecting the general political process and contributing to the ex-
change of ideas and provision of information on matters of public impor-
tance and thus it is in the public interest to be broadcast.
Banzahf, a private citizen, complained that the repeated broadcast of
cigarette advertisements, depicting the smoker as young, virile, adventur-
ous, and healthy, constituted implicit commentary on the desirability of
smoking. This has raised a controversial issue, he said, and thereby necessi-
tates an affirmative duty of the licensee to provide adequate coverage of
the view opposed to smoking. The licensee's defense was that he had, in
good faith, incorporated the anti-smoking sentiment elsewhere in his pro-
gramming (including a few free Cancer Society spots), thus striking a bal-
ance of interests and satisfying his obligation under the fairness doctrine.
In its opinion, the court upheld an FCC order that WCBS devote a
"significant amount" of broadcast time to the anti-smoking view over and
above the balance of coverage already performed. The FCC had officially
left the type of programming and the amount and nature of time given up
to the reasonable judgment of the licensee; but the Commission also sug-
gested that a reasonable means of accomplishing the increased coverage
might be the broadcasting of a number of Cancer Society and HEW public
service announcements each week.
41. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
42. Id. at 1101.
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Rather than limit itself to the jargon of the traditional fairness doc-
trine: "good faith judgment," "reasonable balance," "reasonable oppor-
tunity," etc., the court found that the
ruling is really a simple and practical one, required by the public
interest. The licensee who has a duty to 'operate in the public
interest' . . . is presenting commercials urging the consumption of
a product whose normal use has been found by the Congress and
the Government to represent a serious potential hazard to public
health. . . .43
Thus, in the view of the legislative history of the Cigarette Labeling Act,
44
which fully documents the danger to a large portion of the public, the
obligation to effectively present the side opposed to smoking "stems not
from any esoteric requirements of a particular doctrine but from the sim-
ple fact that the public interest means nothing if it does not include such
a responsibility."45
The court concluded that:
The Commission could reasonably determine the news broadcasts,
private and governmental educational programs, the information
provided by other media, and the prescribed warnings on each
cigarette pack inadequately inform the public of the extent to
which its life and health are most probably in jeopardy. The mere
fact that information is available, or even that it is actually heard
or read, does not mean that it is effectively understood. 40
In Banzahf, it is conceded that the pro-smoking sentiment found in
commercials may not really raise substantial arguments for a major public
debate or controversy; (the general fairness doctrine has not been invoked
in the past when such a controversy is lacking).47 Nevertheless, the court
found that, though the FCC can neither claim expertise in deciding ques-
tions of public health nor the power to "condemn every broadcast which
43. Id. at 1092-93, quoting from Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette
Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 949 (1967).
44. Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp.
1966).
45. 405 F.2d 1082, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1968), quoting from Applicability of the Fairness
Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 949 (1967).
46. 405 F.2d at 1098-99.
47. [W]e do not think protracted discussion of the fairness doctrine will
materially advance our inquiry. . . . [E]ven if incorporated into the fairness
doctrine, the ruling before us is . . . a novel application. In only one instance
has the Commission previously held the advertising of a consumer product
subject to the rule that broadcasters' presentation of controversial public issues
must be fair and balanced.
We also note that elsewhere the Commission has been hesitant to invoke the
fairness doctrine where a controversial issue is raised only by implication.
Id. at 1091-92. See also Letter to Mrs. M. Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647 (1965).
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might, without arbitrariness or caprice, be thought to pose some danger to
public health," the special public interest in informing the public as to
the near proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a danger to the lives of a
large sector of society warrants the granting of special access to the airwaves
to the Cancer Society and HEW. The licensee, operating with the broad
discretion afforded him by the traditional fairness doctrine, had not met
the affirmative duty required of him under this particular public interest.
Commenting generally on the efficiency of the fairness doctrine in the
past the court stated that:
If the fairness doctrine cannot withstand First Amendment scru-
tiny, the reason is that to insure a balanced presentation of con-
troversial issues may be to insure no presentation or no vigorous
presentation at all. But where, as here, one party to a debate [the
cigarette companies] has a financial clout and a compelling eco-
nomic interest in the presentation of one side unmatched by its
opponent, and where the public stake in the argument is no less
than life itself-we think the purpose of rugged debate is served,
not hindered, by an attempt to redress the balance.48
Finally, as in Red Lion, the Banzahf opinion suggests two different ap-
proaches to the concept of fairness in broadcasting. First, the court, in
affirming the FCC order to broadcast anti-smoking spots, may have been
seeking to bolster the validity of the fairness doctrine by infusing a new
specificity into the public interest standard for this case and hereby more
dearly define the licensee's obligation. Secondly, the court may have been
trying to shed the "esoteric requirements" of the doctrine (including the
licensee's right to reasonable, good faith discretion in programming and
balancing interests) and find an independent basis for the right of the
anti-smoking view to be heard.
IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEw FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF AccEss
INDEPENDENT OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
In conjunction with his observations on the problems of access to the
airwaves, Mr. Justice White, in the majority opinion in Red Lion stated
that "it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
market place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.... ',49 This
statement was supported by a citation to New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 0 raising the possibility that a first amendment right of access may
be emerging.
48. 405 F.2d 1082, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
49. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
50. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as New York Times].
675
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In New York Times, an Alabama libel judgment against the Times
newspaper was reversed on first amendment grounds that there is a
".. . profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. . . ."51 Though the
advertisement attack on a public official was of a libelous nature, it was
considered by the Court "an expression of grievance and protest on one
of the major public issues of our time . . ,"52 and, therefore, dearly quali-
fying for constitutional protection. The Court concluded that "constitu-
tional protection does not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility
of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."' 3 Consequently, a "central
meaning of the First Amendment" is found in the principle that "seditious
libel cannot be the subject of government sanction" in a free society.6
4
In contrast to policies implicit in the 1798 Sedition Act and the Ala-
bama law on civil libel in question, the Supreme Court found support for
".. . the privilege of the citizen-critic of government . . ." and declared
that, absent actual malice, "it is as much his duty to criticize as it is the
official's duty to administer."55
Commitment to robust, uninhibited and wide-open discussion, freedom
of society based on freedom from seditious libel laws, and the duty of the
citizen-critic are notions that caused Professor Kalven to consider the New
York Times opinion a major liberating event for the first amendment. It
is "an invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public official, to
government policy, to public policy, to matters in the public domain....
[I]f the Court accepts the invitation, it will slowly work out for itself the
theory of free speech that Alexander Meiklejohn has been offering us for
some fifteen years now."' 6
In a democracy, the citizen as a ruler is our most important
public official. 57
S. [N]o suggestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because
it is on one side of the issue rather than the other... These con-
flicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because
they are valid but because they are relevant.58
51. Id. at 270.
52. Id. at 271.
53. Id.
54. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the
First Amendment, in TE SuPREmE CoURT Rzvmv 191, 209 (P. Kurland ed. 1964). See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273, 275, 279 (1964).
55. 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
56. Kalven, supra note 54, at 221.
57. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL REFDom: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF rTE
PEoPLE 34-36 (2d ed. 1965).
58. Id. at 26-28.
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Regardless of how one judges the impact of New York Times on the
scope of the first amendment, it is probably safe to conclude that it some-
what discredited the old notions on the freedom of speech and its general
limitations: "balancing the interest in freedom against the social interest
sought by inhibiting communication," 59 (as in applying the "clear and
present danger" test to speech in the interest of national stability and
security). More specifically, the decision lessened the threat of legal pen-
alty on the newspaper writer for failing to print what was considered ab-
solutely "true" and "fair" to all interested parties; the opinion encouraged
individuals to make a more aggressive effort to be heard.
The goals of fairness, reaching the truth, and providing the opportu-
nity to be heard on the airwaves go to the heart of the fairness doctrine.
Historically, however, the doctrine's success in encouraging the broadest
dissemination of views and informed public participation in debate has
been limited. With the fairness doctrine the FCC has attempted, on the
one hand, to induce broadcasters to open up their facilities to discussion
of controversial issues, but, on the other, it has balanced this interest with
the need to avoid government intervention in free press by allowing the
broadcaster to exercise his own judgment as to the fairness of programming.
The Red Lion opinion recognizes some of the deficiencies in this
laissez-faire balancing technique in broadcasting. By citing New York
Times, the Court may be suggesting that the marketplace-of-ideas concept
takes on a more "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" character; there-
fore, the court may be finding a "central meaning of the First Amend-
ment" in the principle that no licensee has the right to deny access to his
facilities ,to any view or voice in a free society. Perhaps the Court is dem-
onstrating a new concern for the manner in which an idea is expressed,
that is, a concern that it be expressed by the most effective spokesman,
that -it be able to reach the most relevant audience, and that it is given a
chance to actively compete in the marketplace-of-ideas.6 0
Similarly, Banzahf recognized that current performance under the fair-
ness doctrine may not insure that the public is adequately informed about
controversial issues, particularly since the broadcaster is subject to powerful
economic pressure from the cigarette industry. Thus, an individual's right
as a citizen-critic to be heard may go beyond the right to reply to a per-
sonal attack or to have a view represented in a controversial debate under
the fairness doctrine.
Professor Barron has stated that "modern realities have demonstrated
that the goals of the First Amendment can be fully achieved only by im-
59. Kalven, supra note 54, at 215.
60. Accord, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting).
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posing an affirmative duty on the owners of the media and government to
provide access for protest." 61 Indeed, several recent cases in lower federal
courts have dealt with the importance of access to a particular forum.
Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority62 dealt with the refusal by
the New York City Transit Authority and the New York Subways Adver-
tising Co., Inc., to allow members-of Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) to put up posters in the subway stations opposing the Vietnam
War, although the organization had offered to pay the regular price and
there was space available. The Authority and the advertising company
argued that there were space limitations, the posters were too provocative,
and they would cause disturbances and vandalism. District Court Judge
Bonsal ruled that since posters involving ideological matters had previously
been accepted, the posters in question could not be rejected merely for
their controversial nature. The judge also seemed to outlaw the banning
of all politically controversial advertising in the subway as a legitimate
escape from the affirmative obligation to provide access: "a state may not
unduly suppress free communication of views ... under the guise of con-
serving desirable conditions. 6 33
Wolin v. Port of New York Authority64 arose from the denial by the
Port of New York Authority to permit two anti-Vietnam War organiza-
tions to distribute leaflets in the main concourse and passageways of the
Port of New York Authority Terminal Building. The court held that they
were entitled to distribute leaflets as long as they did not substantially
hinder the traffic flow, on the grounds that if "property [is] essentially dedi-
cated to the public use, the citizen's fundamental right freely to express
his views in a public place must be recognized ... ."05 Judge Mansfield also
commented: "Nor does the fact a person might impart his ideas effectively
in another place provide any reason for denying a person's right to mani-
fest his views in a spot of his own choosing."
66
Affirming the judgment, Judge Kaufman added that sometimes the
forum selected for protest is the object of the protest and at other times,
it is selected because that is "where the relevant audience may be found." 07
An anti-war group has "a constitutionally cognizable interest in reaching a
broad audience." 68 Barron concludes from these cases:
61. Baron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37
GEo. WA SH. L. REv. 487 (1969).
62. 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
63. Id. at 443, quoting from Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308
(1939).
64. 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
65. Id. at 859.
66. Id. at 863.
67. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968).
68. Id. at 94.
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Creating a constitutionally cognizable right to access certainly is
a more sensitive response to first amendment problems that [sic]
the laissez-faire 'market place of ideas' concept, which assumed
that if the dissenter could speak or write somewhere, [or if his
view was 'reasonably' covered in the general programming of a
'good faith' licensee], society at large somehow would find the
message and respond to it.69
The Supreme Court has, itself, recognized the relevance of particular
forums to first amendment policies. In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc.,70 an informational picket line had formed in a privately
owned shopping plaza and had been enjoined from further activity by the
Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, Pennsylvania, on trespass grounds.
Recognizing that the shopping plaza served as perhaps the most effective
suburban forum for airing controversy over certain issues (including work-
ing conditions, prices, and hiring practices) the Court held that private
ownership was not itself a bar to the exercise of first amendment rights.
The Court apparently viewed the plaza as "quasi-public" in nature and,
as Barron suggests, seemed to go along with the idea in Wolin that
".... wherever there are public facilities through which large numbers of
people can be easily reached, there is a right of access to those facilities by
groups interested in using them for purposes of political expression." 71
It is not unreasonable that the airwaves be viewed as such a quasi-
public forum through which large numbers of people can be easily reached.
With this in mind, the hint of a first amendment right of access to the
airwaves emerging from Red Lion and Banzahf seems more conceivable.
Though the fairness doctrine was originally designed to encourage an
affirmative duty to seek out and broadcast controversial issues of public
importance, the opinions in Red Lion and Banzahf reflect the view that
the FCC's concern with preserving the full discretion of the licensee in pro-
gramming has not contributed to the effective promotion of the fairness
goals. The opinions indicate, at least, a concern that a more comprehen-
sive and enforceable duty be imposed on the licensee.
The duty might be defined in terms of a public interest that no indi-
vidual be denied the right of access to a licensee's facilities on the grounds
that his views are objectionable or inflammatory; an individual has a
right to express his opinion on a public question as he finds most effective,
not as a broadcaster reasonably believes to be fair. The FCC, in turn, as
a guardian of the public interest and first amendment rights of free ex-
69. Barron, supra note 61, at 491.
70. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
71. Barron, supra note 61, at 494.
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pression over the airwaves (quasi-public in nature) is entitled to ensure
the duty of the licensee and the right of the spokesman without violating
the first amendment or the censorship clause of the Communications Act.
V. THE JELINEK COMPLAINT
The petition filed with the FCC by Mr. Jelinek was essentially a com-
plaint that the discretion allowed the licensee in programming pro and
anti-military or Vietnam War sentiment has wrought no vigorous or effec-
tive presentation of the anti-military induction view. The purpose of
rugged debate has not been served because of the political and economic
clout and compelling interest of the Government in the presentation of
one side unmatched by its opponent; the public stake in the argument is
life itself. The federal government, states the complaint, "does not own the
public airwaves, any more than the licensees do: the airwaves are owned by
the people. Controversial issues expressed by government agencies or gov-
ernment officials have as much right to be challenged under the fairness
doctrine as any other views."7 2
The complaint first established the relevance of the fairness doctrine
to the case by arguing that, insofar as the licensee voluntarily chose to
broadcast a particular free public service announcement that favors one
side of a controversial issue, he has, in effect, editorialized as to that issue;73
he is therefore bound by a legal obligation to provide reasonable oppor-
tunity for broadcasting an opposing public service announcement over his
facilities.
To establish the controversial nature of the issue, whether participa-
tion in the armed forces is desirable, the complaint offered evidence of the
issue's involvement in the general political process: there is nationwide dis-
pute over United States' involvement in Vietnam and there is growing con-
cern over the physical and mental harm that military life may cause. It is
no longer generally accepted, for example, that the military builds men
and trains leaders. In fact, Dr. Bourne, a former Army medical officer in
Vietnam has stated that:
72. Complaint to the F.C.C. on behalf of San Francisco Women For Peace,
4C2-1625 (Feb. 26, 1970).
73. Mr. Jelinek explains in the complaint that, with the exception of the unique
case of smoking commercials in Banzahf, the broadcast of commercial spots is normally
presumed to be neutral, the licensee's only inducement to broadcast commercials being
financial gain. When the licensee broadcasts free public service announcements, how-
ever, the presumption of neutrality is destroyed.
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While ithe right to officially confer manliness is an indispens-
able part of the military reward system, and particularly of basic
training, it is largely a deception, for military life offers not the
attributes of mature manhood, but more nearly a permanent at-
tenuation of adolescence.74
If the argument for a reasonable opportunity to reply to the armed
forces spots had ceased at this point, the FCC might have more under-
standably, in the context of the history of the fairness doctrine, responded
as it did that:
1) The licensee has not acted without reason in deciding that mili-
tary recruitment spots do not raise a controversial issue.75
2) Even if the recruitment spots are "inextricably intertwined" with
the concededly controversial conduct of the war in Vietnam and
the Selective Service draft, "there is no indication that any of the
stations against whom the complaint was filed have failed to treat
the issues of Vietnam and the draft ... in conformance with the
fairness doctrine."7
8) "Under the fairness doctrine, it is the licensee's obligation in the
first instance to make a determination regarding the controversial
nature of an issue and whether an issue, if it is controversial, is
one of public importance. Unless the licensee's judgment is shown
to be unreasonable, the Commission will not upset the judgment
of the licensee."77
The petitioners claimed, however, that while the precise selection and
timing of the anti-induction material may be left to the discretion of the
74. P. Bourne, Psycho-Social Phenomena Observed in Basic Training with Implica-
tions for Later Personality Effects 102, American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n Annual Meeting,
April, 1969.
75. In re Complaint on behalf of San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d
156, 157, 158 (1970).
76. Id. at 158.
77. Id. at 157. See also Letter to Judy Collins, 24 F.C.C.2d 741 (1970), in which
the FCC responded to a complaint filed by the well-known folk singer, Judy Collins.
Miss Collins appeared on ABC's "Dick Cavett Show" on February 6, 1970. Her
comments with regard to various controversial issues raised in the pending "Chicago
Seven" trial were cut from the broadcast. She complained that her right of free speech
had been unduly restricted and that the broadcast had acted inappropriately under the
fairness doctrine.
The FCC replied that it was satisfied with the reasonableness of discretion em-
ployed by the broadcaster and ABC's general policy of eliminating speech that may
prejudice pending litigation and threaten the American legal process as a whole. The
FCC stated that "the Communications Act of 1934 states in section 3 (h) that a broad-
caster shall not be deemed a common carrier and therefore is not obligated to accept
any program matter which may be offered to him for broadcast. The licensee may
establish standards governing the acceptability of broadcast material and is free to
exercise his discretion in deleting portions of programs." Id. at 741.
The FCC also remarked that ". . . the protection afforded freedom of speech in the
Constitution does not guarantee to any person the use of any particular platform,
microphone or other means for the expression of his views." Id.
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licensee, the FCC should, in this case, order the granting of "substantially
equivalent" time to present the anti-induction view with a recommenda-
tion, similar to that in the anti-smoking case, that a reasonable means of
discharging this responsibility would be the broadcast of several anti-
military induction public service announcements each week. To this end
the scope of the complaint's argument was broadened. It questioned the
effectiveness of the fairness doctrine in insuring that broadcasting be op-
erated in the true public interest and challenged the FCC to recognize
more realistic criteria upon which to establish a licensee's affirmative duty.
Though the armed forces' public service announcements address them-
selves only to voluntary enlistment and do not specify any views as to the
war in Vietnam, the morality of warfare, or the induction system, it was
the contention of the petitioners that, like the cigarette advertisements in
the Banzahf case, the armed forces' spots serve as a type of propaganda that
may cause hesitance on the part of a potential draftee to question the
image created. Armed forces' spots, in contrast to the discussion programs or
newscasts in which the anti-military induction view has been allegedly cov-
ered, may be designed to induce a specific psychological effect through their
content and repetition. They are broadcast uncontested and without the
infusion of attempted objectivity and balance by moderators or reporters.
Thus, if the potential draftee is the slightest bit unsure of his manliness or
capability to succeed and he listens to the recruitment spots, he may never
consider the alternatives to enlistment or involuntary induction that are
open to him. His choice to join the military or be drafted may not be the
product of an independent, informed judgment. This result is hardly con-
sistent with the supposed effort to preserve a truly uninhibited and wide-
open marketplace-of-ideas.
The complaint quoted the opinion in Red Lion as to the public's first
amendment right to be informed and the fairness doctrine's goal of en-
couraging robust and uninhibited discussion. From this basis, it might be
argued on behalf of the petitioners that the FCC should conclude, as it did
in the anti-smoking case, that the current coverage of the military induc-
tion and Vietnam War issues has inadequately informed the public of the
extent to which its life and health are threatened by participation in the
armed forces; the mere fact that anti-military and deferment information
has been available, or even that it is actually heard or read does not mead!
that it is effectively understood. Consequently, (as the FCC had ruled in
Red Lion and Banzahf), the licensee should be required to share his facili-
ties with a particular group or individual who is more directly involved
and likely to inform the public effectively.
Anticipating difficulty in convincing the FCC that discussion of the
issue concerning the desirability of military life warrants constitutional
COMMENTS
protection as a matter of public importance, Jelinek drew an analogy to
the special public interest standard (independent of the fairness doctrine)
used in the Banzahf case: Aside from public controversy over current
United States' military activity and scientific evidence as to the harmful
effects of military life, Congress, in enacting its Selective Service Act,78 has
recognized that the military may not be desirable in several cases. The Act
provides deferments and exemptions for certain age groups, for education,
for certain physical or mental idiosyncracies that may be worsened or
cause death in military activity, and for particular religious or moral con-
victions that the individual may be forced to compromise in warfare. Thus,
in light of a specialized congressionally-mandated interest in the health
and welfare of a large sector of society (potential draftees and returning
veterans), the FCC, argued Jelinek, should require a distinct obligation on
the part of a licensee that goes beyond his allegedly "fair" performance
under the fairness doctrine.
The FCC neither considered the complaint as encouraging the applica-
tion under the fairness doctrine of more definitive criteria, nor as a sug-
gestion that new first amendment grounds, independent of the doctrine,
serve as a foundation for the licensee's legal obligation to provide access
and an individual's right of access, generally. The Commission main-
tained a passive role and limited its review to the overall service of the
licensee to the public interest. The complaint's allegations as to the in-
adequacy of the current coverage of anti-induction views and as to the
licensee's ability, through his "reasonable" discretion, to avoid a special
public interest may point to inherent flaws in the operation of the fairness
doctrine under this type of direction. The question remains, however,
which approach might best in the long run serve to facilitate the type of
access in question and contribute to the development of a truly wide-
open and informative public forum.
The anti-induction spots offer a direct challenge to the United States'
present policy of defense and national security. The announcements are
designed to induce potential draftees to seriously question the nature of
their role as American citizens and patriots. In a sense, the announcements
encourage young men to assume the duties of "citizen-critic" in a truly
robust, uninhibited, wide-open society. As Mr. Jelinek explained, "con-
troversial issues expressed by government agencies or government officials
have as much right to be challenged under the fairness doctrine as any
other views."
79
78. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 454 (1987).
79. Complaint to the F.C.C. on behalf of San Francisco Women For Peace,
#C2-1625 (Feb. 26, 1970).
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Theoretically, the fairness doctrine does incorporate expression op-
posed to government policies, but, as we have seen in this case, the Com-
mission refused to apply the doctrine so as to force a licensee to grant the
increased access demanded.
The FCC is interested in facilitating the broadest dissemination of
views and ideas but it is also committed to protecting the freedom of the
broadcaster and, most importantly, to balancing the interests of society in
public discussion-contributing to the stability of society. The fairness doc-
trine is burdened with satisfying all of these goals. It establishes a duty of
the commercial licensee to seek out and cover controversial issues of public
importance and imposes a vague standard of fairness and objectivity on the
licensee's programming. This general standard in conjunction with his
equally vague power of reasonable discretion has been shown to have a
moderating or stabilizing effect on programming. In a case where a type of
speech or its manner of presentation appears to the licensee to be incon-
sistent with the public interest because of its political or economic ramifi-
cations, for example, he need not permit access to that speech or he may
present the view that it represents in a more objective and balanced form
than was requested. Under the fairness doctrine, the licensee is obliged to
maintain this balance. The interest of the federal government and its agen-
des in maintaining a stable, ordered society, combined with the licensee's
efforts to satisfy the FCC's standard of fairness and the audience, and spon-
sor's -taste has imposed a limit to the freedom of individual citizens to
speak and be heard. The fairness doctrine has contributed to and permitted
the existence of self-censorship in broadcasting. Given this condition, the
occasional infusion of specific rules on the sharing of radio facilities under
the fairness doctrine (as discussed in Red Lion) or of special scientifically-
documented, congressionally-mandated definitions of the public interest (as
found in Banzahf) will most likely not provide a truly robust, uninhibited,
and wide-open forum for public discussion. Mr. Jelinek's case for requiring
access to the defendants' facilities might find more solid and constructive
ground in the realm of an individual first amendment right of access to
the airwaves.
If the FCC had recognized the possibility and necessity of a newly
emerging first amendment right of access to the airwaves from the cases dis-
cussed above, it might have ordered the granting of "substantially equiva-
lent" time to the anti-induction view and required the broadcast of several
public service announcements each week on the following grounds:
1) Suitable access to "social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas
and experiences" must be provided.80 The FCC is entitled to rule
80. 395 U.S. 867, 389 (1969).
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as the "public convenience, necessity, and interest require."81 It is
in the public interest that discussion of matters of importance and
controversy be "robust, uninhibited, and wide-open."82
2) The anti-induction groups in question have a "constitutionally
cognizable interest" in reaching a broad audience effectively.83
The licensee should not be allowed to deny access to a speaker
merely on the grounds that his expression might be disturbing or
provocative;84 nor should the availability of other forums serve as
a reason to deny a spokesman his choice of the airwaves.85 Since
the airwaves are of a quasi-public nature, capable of reaching
large numbers of people, they must be open to parties offering
political expression.86
3) When the possibility arises that information and views on an issue
of public importance or controversy are not being disseminated by
the most effective spokesmen to the most relevant audience, it is
the right of the viewers and listeners to receive the information
and the right of the citizen-critic to be heard, not the right of the
broadcaster to strike a balance of interests, that is paramount.8 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the FCC's record in passing on complaints arising under the
fairness doctrine it was predictably unlikely that a majority of its mem-
bers would find that either: 1) a special public interest had arisen (as in
Banzahf) so significant as to require access over and above that which has
"reasonably" been provided by the licensee, or 2) that a new individual
right of access had emerged from the Red Lion case such as to, prohibit
the licensee from denying access to the petitioners. The Commission fell
back on the traditional policy of the doctrine that the identification and
coverage of controversial issues be left to -the good faith discretion of the
licensee and that the FCC's role be limited to a general review of his per-
formance in the public interest. Jelinek's complaint was consequently
denied. The only concession made by the Commission was that their deci-
sion did not "imply that nothing connected with a public service announce-
ment could bear upon a controversial issue of public importance."88
The continuing use of a vague standard of conduct for the licensee
and an equally illusive standard of review for the Commission in the fair-
81. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307 (a), (d) (1964).
82. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
83. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968).
84. Kissinger v. New York Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
85. Wolin v. Port of Nev York Authority, 392 F.2d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1968).
86. Food Employees Local v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968).
87. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 895 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964).
88. 24 F.C.C.2d 156, 158 (1970).
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ness policy allows the FCC, in its administrative discretion, to avoid en-
forcing any definitive legal obligation on the broadcaster, whether it be
in the context of the fairness doctrine or an independent first amendment
right of access. Under current policy, then, the FCC might feel compelled
to penalize a licensee or refuse to renew his license only where he has
been grossly unreasonable or arbitrary in his programming practices and
has clearly, and in bad faith, acted to the detriment of the public interest.
Consequently, with respect to most access complaints the FCC may remain
disentangled from the conflict and simply issue a statement that the licen-
see had acted within his reasonable discretion. By the same token, because
of the Commission's limited involvement and its application of a policy
of only general fairness guidelines it is unlikely that a court, lacking defini-
tive and specific legal standards of conduct, would review the Commission's
decision unless there was evidence of gross irrationality on the part of
the Commission or the licensee.
Perhaps if the FCC were to render the licensee's obligation to operate
under the fairness doctrine a more exact one, the Commission would nec-
essarily assume a more aggressive role in implementing its fairness policies.
The FCC would then not always rely on licensee's reasonable discretion
and good faith judgment in passing on a complaint; it might decide, for
example, that, though the licensee's decision to deny certain access was not
grossly unreasonable or arbitrary, the Commission's view of the public
interest in the case necessitated granting the type of access requested or at
least more extensive coverage of an issue than had been planned by the
licensee. Questions regarding the effectiveness of the dissemination of
information and the appropriateness of the spokesmen in representing
sides to a particular controversial issue would be raised whereas they would
most likely not be under the traditional standards of the fairness doctrine.
By the same token, if a complaint were denied by a "final action" of the
Commission under the revised and more particularized policy, a court
might find more grounds for review in attacking irregularities in the FCC's
implementation of that policy. To carry this analysis one final step, it
might be argued that the increased involvement of the FCC in implement-
ing a policy of fairness and its composite standards of conduct, leading to
expanded reviewability of the Commission's treatment of complaints,
would also cause the courts to take notice of inherent flaws in the fairness
doctrine and -to begin to consider the need for a type of access ,that is self-
executing, independent of any government agency policy.
It is arguable that the Supreme Court in Red Lion has already alluded
to this possibility. While the FCC, in responding to new complaints, may
not choose to so construe the Court's holding, it has on occasion since
Jelinek applied the language of the Red Lion opinion in such a way as
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to indicate at least the assumption of a more active role in determining
whether the good faith licensee is actually and realistically serving the
public interest in his presentation of a particular controversial issue. In
August, 1970, for example, the Commission rejected a request by the
Democratic National Committee for a declaratory judgment to the effect
that "responsible entities" had a first amendment right to access for solici-
tation of funds and comment on public issues." The Commission also
denied special access to the Committee for discussion of public issues under
the fairness doctrine. But in upholding the licensee's reasonable behavior
in this situation, the FCC added new specificity to the character of the dis-
cretionary task of the broadcaster. Citing the authority of Red Lion, the
FCC stated that the licensee as a public trustee must " ...present repre-
sentative community views and voices on controversial issues which are
of importance to his listeners. This means also that some of the voices
must be partisan. A licensee policy of excluding partisan voices and always
itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive manner would run counter
to the 'profound national commitment ,that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 90
Later in the month the Commission replied to such groups as the Com-
mittee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, Business Execu-
tives Move for Vietnam Peace, and Fourteen United States Senators.9 1 They
had argued that the networks or licensees had not achieved fairness in view
of the number of Presidential prime time and uninterrupted broadcasts on
the Indo-China War and the complainants' efforts to present the contrast-
ing view.
9 2
While the Commission again specifically rejected allegations that a
first amendment right of access had emerged from the Red Lion decision,
it construed the holdings to require the imposition of seemingly dearer and
more stringent standards of behavior on the broadcaster.
In stressing that the licensee has considerable discretion in dis-
charging his fairness obligation, we do not mean to imply* that
that discretion is absolute .... [W]e will intervene if the showing
establishes that the licensee has acted unreasonably. . . . [I]t is
patently unreasonable for a licensee consistently to present one
side in prime time and to relegate the contrasting viewpoint to
periods outside prime time. Similarly, there can be an imbalance
89. In re Democratic National Committee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
90. Id. at 222-25.
91. In re Complaint of Committee for Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues,
25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970).
92. Id. at 296.
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from the sheer weight on one side as against the other. But there
is no mathematical formula on any of these questions. What is
called for is a judgment on the facts of each case .... 93
The Commission concluded that while in theory the objectives of the fair-
ness doctrine ought to have been satisfied upon the good faith, non arbi-
trary judgment of the licensee, the practicalities of the situation dictated
that effective presentation of contrasting views to the Indo-China policy
required one more opportunity for an uninterrupted prime time presenta-
tion by an appropriate spokesman on the three networks. 94 Consequently,
the Commission intervened.
In granting the increased access in this case the Commission insisted
that, not only did the licensee's privilege to broadcast depend upon strict
adherence to the fairness doctrine, 5 but compliance with the agency's fair-
ness policy could be accomplished only by operating "reasonably and
realistically" under the circumstances. 96
In the meantime the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule-Making
in May, 1970. It offers ". .. a modest further step in promoting access to
the broadcast media."97 With the Red Lion decision as its authority the
Commission suggests that the licensee be required to be "truly an expert
on his community's problems and interest;" that he be able to actively en-
courage debate by recruiting those "who deeply believe in the cause for
which they speak" in the event that those persons do not voluntarily ap-
pear and request access.98
In these recent cases and the proposed rule-making, the FCC empha-
sizes that it is not straying from the basic fairness doctrine principles of
the 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees and the 1959
amendment to section 315 of the Communication Act. However, by add-
ing a practical element to the notion of fairness and the right of the public
to be adequately informed, the FCC may be abandoning its passive reliance
on the good faith and rationality of the broadcaster to identify contro-
versial issues and provide effective access to appropriate spokesmen with
only the public interest in mind. The Commission may also be substituting
its general review of the licensee's performance under the fairness doctrine
with a particularistic analysis of the reasonableness and practicality of his
actions under each set of circumstances. In other words, whereas the
licensee, as a student of the public interest (under the traditional imple-
mentation of the doctrine), could survive with a general knowledge and
93. Id. at 292-93 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 298.
95. Id. at 292.
96. Id. at 298.
97. 35 Fed. Reg. 7820, 7821 (1970) .
98. Id.
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average performance, he may now be called upon to act as an "expert"
public trustee.
It is not clear how helpful this possible trend in the operation of the
fairness doctrine could be in another Jelinek complaint. An admission by
the Commission that a public service announcement might raise a contro-
versial issue and invoke fairness policies and the adoption of tighter con-
trol over fairness questions and the discretion of licensees may still not
solve the problems of reconciling the individual's or group's interest in
access, the right of the public to be adequately informed, the interests of
the broadcaster as a businessman, and the practice of administrative dis-
cretion in a government regulatory agency.
Certainly the groups represented by Jelinek have little or no adminis-
trative or judicial remedy under the traditional standards of the fairness
doctrine as long as the licensee demonstrated some reason in his actions.
But under a more aggressive approach to fairness by the FCC the risk exists
that administrative discretion will not consistently serve the interest of the
public. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that when an act of the Commis-
sion is challenged on the basis of first amendment rights, either that of
the public to be informed or that of the individual or group to speak, a
court will take notice of harmful inconsistencies in the implementation
of ithe fairness doctrine and consider a doctrine of "pure access," an in-
dependent first amendment right of access to the airwaves in all or in
selected areas of broadcasting.
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